

CHAPTER 14

PRAGMATISM
AND THE COLD
WAR

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In the years following World War II, relations between the United States and its Western European allies, on the one hand, and the Soviet Union and its allies, on the other, grew increasingly tense. The term *Cold War* was introduced by Truman advisor Bernard Baruch to refer to the period in international relations, running roughly from the mid-1940s to the early 1990s, during which the world's two superpowers—the United States and the Soviet Union—were locked in military, social, ideological, and economic struggles which constantly threatened, but ultimately fell just short of, all-out conventional, or *hot*, war. The period was marked by a general breakdown of diplomatic relations between the two nations, resulting in a nuclear arms race, massive military spending, and a series of proxy wars within smaller states between factions representing the interests of (and often funded by) the superpowers.

In the United States, the Cold War precipitated a period of social anxiety popularly described as the *McCarthy Era*. Running from the late 1940s to the late 1950s, the McCarthy Era was driven by increasing suspicion that key social and political institutions of the United States were being infiltrated

by Communists and anti-Americanists of other stripes on behalf of a Soviet-controlled international Communist organization devoted ultimately to the dissolution of American democracy. The concern over Communist infiltration developed into outright paranoia following Senator Joseph McCarthy's 1950 speech in West Virginia in which he claimed to have compiled a substantial list of known Communists working in the State Department of the United States. This led to the formation of the Tydings Committee (whose official charge was to investigate the alleged Communist infiltration of the State Department) and eventually to the McCarthy-led Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations and the House Committee on Un-American Activities, which conducted the now infamous public hearings on Communist influence on American society that brought intellectuals, artists, librarians, military officers, and Hollywood actors, among others, under suspicion of disloyalty.

How did these tumultuous times impact America's indigenous school of philosophy? According to a narrative that dominates contemporary work on pragmatism, the Cold War Era saw in professional philosophy an "eclipse" of pragmatism by more technical forms of philosophizing described variously as "logical positivism", "scientism", or, most generally, "analytic philosophy". Some have suggested that the concurrence of this eclipse with the Cold War is not coincidental. John McCumber (2001), for example, has argued that the Cold War in general, and McCarthyism in particular, produced strong institutional incentives for academics in the United States to retreat from the public sphere and adopt more insular concerns and methodologies. According to McCumber, analytic philosophy, which he describes as being focused on technical issues concerning language and logic, provided an apolitical safe haven for philosophers in America, while pragmatism, a philosophical school that insists that philosophers must attend to what Dewey called the "problems of men" (*MW* 10: 46)¹ and be publicly engaged, was a natural casualty of the Cold War.²

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We need not take up the issue of whether McCumber is correct to hold that the Cold War played a direct causal role in the eclipse of pragmatism. What is central to our present purpose is the eclipse narrative itself, the view that pragmatism was marginalized and dormant in the years roughly corresponding to the Cold War, and was resuscitated in the 1980s.

¹ References to Dewey follow the standard formula: abbreviation, volume number, then page number.

² Menand suggests a similar account, stating that the "intellectual climate of the Cold War" (2001: 439) was hostile to pragmatic ways of thinking.

The eclipse narrative is a resurrection story of a familiar stripe. The original pragmatists arrive on the scene around the turn of the century and attempt to overturn the past by exposing the untenable assumptions underlying traditional philosophy. They offer a radical and new kind of philosophy, one which upsets traditional assumptions and dethrones the *status quo*. Pragmatism prevails for a brief while, but then the force of tradition reemerges and forces pragmatism underground. Darkness descends. But eventually pragmatism reemerges, due in large measure to the publication of Richard Rorty's ground-breaking 1979 work *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*, which restored the philosophical reputation of John Dewey and opened the field to new work in pragmatism.³

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Like many resurrection stories, the eclipse narrative is also a persecution story. It contends that pragmatism was not refuted but "eclipsed". This element of the story runs as follows: Advances in formal logic associated with Russell and Frege gave rise to faddish intellectual trends that placed the analysis of language at the core of philosophy, thereby making it seem more scientific and rigorous; consequently, the pragmatists, who emphasized experience rather than language, were simply dismissed as confused, imprecise, irrelevant, or worse. The story continues, that now we see that the "linguistic turn" characteristic of analytic philosophy was simply an error and that pragmatism has been all along "waiting at the end of the dialectical road" which analytic philosophy had taken fifty years to traverse (Rorty 1982: p. xviii).

Hence the renaissance of pragmatism is often seen as a kind of *vindication* of pragmatism, a *victory* over analytic philosophy. In this way, the eclipse narrative identifies analytic philosophy as a philosophical *villain* and places pragmatism in opposition to it. Even today, it is widely held that the degree to which analytic philosophy represents the mainstream of philosophy in America is the extent to which pragmatism is being marginalized. Consequently, the eclipse narrative tends to foster an attitude of resentment towards professional philosophy which manifests itself in the tendency to demonize analytic philosophy as "narrow", "irrelevant", and "nihilistic", a tendency

³ It is nearly impossible to find a current work on pragmatism that does not present some version of this story. See, e.g., West 1989: 3; Bernstein 1987; Festenstein 1997: 2; Dickstein 1998: 1; Hickman 1998: p. xii; Caspary 2000: 1; Wilshire 2002; Capps 2003: 1; Fesmire 2003: 2; Hildebrand 2003: 1; McDermott 2004; and Westbrook 2005: p. xii. Good (2003) argues that the eclipse narrative is flawed because pragmatism was never a dominant philosophical movement in America; see also Eldridge 2004.

which Richard Bernstein has rightly criticized as unpragmatic and parochial (1995: 62).⁴

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Though it is the dominant self-understanding among contemporary scholars of pragmatism, the eclipse narrative is highly questionable. For one thing, those who promote the narrative rarely clarify what they mean by “analytic philosophy”, and when a description is offered, it often rings hollow. Bruce Wilshire, for example, identifies analytic philosophy with “scientism”, the view that “only science can know” (2002: 4; cf. McCumber 2001: 49 ff.), but it is clear that only the most extreme of the logical positivists, if anyone, ever held such a stark position. More importantly, if we examine the work of the most influential figures in mainstream philosophy from the past sixty years—Ludwig Wittgenstein, Nelson Goodman, C. I. Lewis, Ernest Nagel, W. V. O. Quine, Donald Davidson, Wilfrid Sellars, Hilary Putman, John Rawls, John Searle, Daniel Dennett, Crispin Wright, Michael Dummett, David Wiggins, Jürgen Habermas, and Robert Brandom—we find that they either explicitly acknowledge a distinctively pragmatist inheritance or take themselves to be responding critically to identifiably pragmatist arguments. Judged by the centrality of distinctively pragmatist theses concerning meaning, truth, knowledge, and action to ongoing debates in philosophy, pragmatism is easily among the most successful philosophical trends of the past two centuries. It seems, then, that the eclipse narrative is demonstrably false; pragmatism was alive and well throughout the Cold War, and it continues to be a major force on the philosophical scene.

Purveyors of the eclipse narrative will respond that the argument above employs the wrong criterion; they will reject the idea that the centrality of pragmatist claims to perpetual debates *within* professional philosophy is an appropriate metric of philosophical success. They will contend that even though Quine, Sellars, Putnam, and the rest clearly borrow from the pragmatisms of Peirce, James, and Dewey, they nonetheless represent an abandonment of pragmatism because they reject the central pragmatist commitment to doing philosophy in a way that is *publicly engaged*. The response continues that it is the *nature of the concerns* to which Quine and the others are attending which constitutes a rejection of pragmatism. Again, the view is that true pragmatism must be addressed to the “problems of men”; pragmatists must be public philosophers.

⁴ See Talisse 2007: ch. 7 for further discussion.

But this defense of the eclipse narrative is problematic. What does it mean to be doing philosophy in a publicly engaged way? If by “public philosopher” we mean something robust such as *public intellectual on the scale of Dewey*, then we confront the fact that Peirce and arguably James were not public philosophers in this sense. Moreover, if highly visible public political engagement is a necessary condition for being a pragmatist, there are almost no pragmatists today, for, since the death of Richard Rorty, Cornel West is the only self-described pragmatist who can plausibly claim to be a public intellectual on such a scale. Yet if we adopt a more modest sense of “public philosopher”, it is difficult to see why figures heavily influenced by pragmatism, such as Habermas, Putnam, and Dennett, should not qualify.

One might respond that Habermas and the others have taken up the role of public philosopher only recently, and that during the Cold War Era there were no public philosophers, and thus no true pragmatists. But this response fails. During the years in which pragmatism was supposedly in “eclipse”, the pragmatist philosopher Sidney Hook was a powerful force in professional philosophy and also among America’s most influential public intellectuals.

It is curious that contemporary pragmatists who promote the eclipse narrative often fail to notice Hook. Indeed, he has been almost completely written out of the history of pragmatism.⁵ This oversight is unfortunate: due consideration of his work instantly casts doubt on the eclipse narrative. Consider that throughout the 1950s and 1960s, much of Hook’s academic work was aimed towards defending pragmatic naturalism against objections raised by Marxists, existentialists, Thomists, and others that pragmatism is narrowly instrumentalist, anti-humanist, ruthlessly capitalist, and, in a word, the intellectual expression of the vulgarities of American culture. In a 1956 essay which reads like a manifesto of pragmatism, “Naturalism and First Principles”, Hook contends that there are standards of rationality that are “not limited to our culture and to our time”, but arise out of

⁵ Hook’s absence from the recent literature on pragmatism is easily documented. Despite the explosion of new work in pragmatism over the past fifteen years, there has been almost no attention paid to Hook. For example, there is no substantial discussion of Hook in Murphy 1990; Campbell 1992; Festenstein 1997; Hart and Anderson 1997; Mounce 1997; Rosenthal, Hausman, and Anderson 1999; Gunn 2001; Menand 2001; Kuklick 2001; MacGilvray 2004; and Stout 2004; John Diggins offers some helpful comments on “Hook’s disappearance from the history of pragmatism” (1998: 224). For many years, the sole exception to this trend was West 1989; but now see Westbrook 2005: ch. 5, and the essays collected in Cotter 2004. See also Haack and Lane (2006), who include Hook in their anthology of pragmatist writings.

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processes of “practical living” (2002 [1956]: 47). Citing scientific method as the “refinement” of these “canons of rationality”, Hook argues that naturalism is the commitment to applying scientific method to all human problems (2002 [1956]: 47). Accordingly, pragmatism is not the attempt somehow to reduce everything to science, as critics allege, but rather the attempt to further develop and systematize the habits of inquiry already embedded in our “successful working practice in solving problems concerning the nature of things” (2002 [1956]: 66).

This kind of encapsulation of pragmatism often raises the charge that it is naïvely optimistic. Hook fixed on this kind of criticism in his presidential address to the American Philosophical Association in 1959—and note that this is at the supposed high point of analytic philosophy’s hegemony. In “Pragmatism and the Tragic Sense of Life”, Hook argues that the moral question “What should I do?” arises “in a situation in which good conflicts with good”, or good conflicts with right (2002 [1960]: 78 f.), or right conflicts with right (2002 [1960]: 81). Accordingly, Hook rebuffs the charge of optimism by the concept of conflict—not between good and evil, but among goods and rights—at the center of pragmatist ethics. In fact, one of the distinctive characteristics of Hook’s pragmatism is the emphasis he places on conflict.⁶

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Most important for present purposes, however, is the fact that, throughout this period of supposed eclipse, and indeed until his death in 1989, Hook engaged in public and sometimes highly visible debates on philosophical and political topics with the likes of Albert Einstein, Bertrand Russell, Noam Chomsky, William F. Buckley, Mortimer Adler, and Herbert Marcuse. That is, *pace* the eclipse narrative, perhaps the most visible and influential public intellectual of the Cold War era was a self-avowed pragmatist philosopher.

It is tempting to conclude that the exclusion of Hook is deliberate, that Hook is ignored precisely because he cannot be fitted into the eclipse narrative. The temptation is heightened by the fact that, among the few who acknowledge Hook at all, some have gone so far as to cite Hook’s “failings as a pragmatist philosopher” (Good 2003: 79) as a *cause* of the eclipse of pragmatism. Along these lines, John Capps contends that Hook hastened pragmatism’s demise by adopting during the Cold War Era argumentative strategies that are

⁶ See also Hook 2002 [1975] and 2002 [1940]. The sensitivity to the importance of conflict may be the result of his early work on Marx’s philosophy.

“touchstones of analytic philosophy” and therefore “at odds” with Hook’s “philosophical identity as a pragmatist” (Capps 2003: 73). The eclipse narrative is preserved by denying that Hook was a pragmatist.

This maneuver is implausible, but it is worth dwelling on Hook’s encounter with the Cold War. According to Capps, the fateful episode which brought about pragmatism’s eclipse was Hook’s public defense in the early 1950s of the view that members of the Communist Party (CP) were unfit to teach in public schools in the United States. Capps claims that Hook’s argument represents the moment at which pragmatism “lost the sensitivity to context which, in happier times, had been one of its defining characteristics” (2003: 62). Capps alleges that once Hook abandoned this “sensitivity to context”, pragmatism was lost.

Let us examine Hook’s infamous position. In several essays and the book, *Heresy, Yes—Conspiracy, No* (1953), Hook argued that the CP was not merely a political party, but a conspiratorial organization under the direct control of a dictator who expressly sought to dismantle Western democracy (1953: 21–34). According to Hook, the CP explicitly cited educational indoctrination as among the means by which it sought to undermine the United States (1953: 181 f.), and it *required* of its members full endorsement of its objectives and methods (1953: 183). Hence membership in the CP signaled an individual’s allegiance to the objectives of the CP (1953: 28 ff.). Hook concluded that CP members were *prima facie* unfit to hold “sensitive” positions, including that of teacher in a public college, advocating the removal of CP members from the relevant positions.

It is important to notice the nuances of Hook’s view. Three preliminary clarifications are worth emphasizing. First, Hook’s argument was not intended to apply to Communists *per se*, but only to members of the CP.⁷ Hook had no problem with *Communist* teachers (1987: 503). Second, Hook did not object to CP members in all areas of society, but only to those who held “sensitive” or “strategic” posts; Hollywood actors were of no concern to Hook (1953: 72). Third, Hook did not argue that CP membership should be *outlawed* or that CP members should be imprisoned for their membership (1953: 26). More importantly, it must be added that Hook argued that CP members should be *suspended* from their positions until a proper inquiry into their activities could be conducted (1987: 504). Hook did not advocate

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⁷ Hook himself was for a long time a self-declared Communist, but never a member of the CP (Phelps 1997: 31–2).

the *automatic* dismissal from a post of a suspected CP member; there was always to be an inquiry into the nature and extent of the person's involvement.⁸

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In a nutshell, then, Hook held the following. The CP is a conspiratorial organization under the direct control of a dictatorship that expressly aims to undermine American democracy. Membership in the CP is granted only after one has pledged allegiance to the CP and its stated aims and methods. Among the methods endorsed by the CP for undermining American democracy is the indoctrination of students in the views officially endorsed by the CP. Accordingly, CP members are *prima facie* committed to instilling the CP positions in students regardless of the evidence or arguments that can be marshaled in their support. Thus CP members are doctrinally bound to reject inquiry as such; they are therefore unable to meet their primary responsibility as professors (Hook 1953: 206–7).

Hook's position is certainly open to challenge, but, *pace* Capps, there is nothing unpragmatic, anti-contextualist, or distinctively "analytic" about the argument. Casting the position in more familiar contexts, Hook's argument is equivalent to the view that airport baggage-checkers who belong to al-Qaeda but have not as yet been shown to have committed terrorist acts should be, at the very least, suspended. When taken in the context of the Cold War and the threat which the CP was then reasonably believed to pose, Hook's position seems a fully pragmatist response.

It is worth emphasizing further that Hook's position presents no conflict with his *democratic* commitments. Let us assume for the sake of argument that Hook was *justified* in believing that the CP was a powerful conspiratorial organization devoted to the undermining of democracy in part by means of educational indoctrination that required of its members full and continuing obedience to its dictates. On this assumption, it is hard to see how Hook's argument represents a democratic failing. Again, Hook's position makes as much sense as a policy of suspending airport baggage inspectors whom we have good reason to believe are members of al-Qaeda, and of dismissing those who prove to be members. Is the latter policy anti-democratic?

Someone might object that the policy of suspending CP teachers—and perhaps even that of dismissing al-Qaeda baggage inspectors—is anti-democratic

⁸ Cf. "Even though I believed that membership in the [CP] rendered an individual unfit . . . to be a member of the teaching staff, I did *not* believe that their mere fact of membership should result in automatic dismissal (Hook 1987: 504).

because it violates the core democratic value of freedom of speech. Hook's proposal, a critic might say, punishes criticism and dissent; yet democracy must keep itself open to such activities. Thus, the critic concludes, Hook's position constitutes a betrayal of democracy.

But this kind of criticism fails to countenance a crucial distinction that Hook insisted upon between *internal* and *external* opposition to democracy. Opposition to a policy or action of a democratic community is internal if it complies with the "rules of the game" of democracy and of democratic discourse (Hook 2002 [1959]: 264). By contrast, opposition is external to the democratic framework if it violates these rules. Hook writes:

Opposition of the first kind, no matter how mistaken, must be tolerated, if for no other reason than that we cannot be sure that it is not we who are mistaken. Opposition of the second kind, no matter what protective coloration it wears . . . must be swiftly dealt with if democracy is to survive. (2002 [1938]: 296)

A distinction of this kind is essential to any viable conception of democracy. That is, any democratic view must draw a distinction between tolerable and intolerable modes of dissent, between *civil* disobedience and *uncivil* disobedience, between opposition and revolt, or, in Hook's nomenclature, between heresy and conspiracy. Hook's position is that modes of political action that attempt to accomplish political aims by means of methods that overtly reject or circumvent standing democratic procedures are *ipso facto* undeserving of tolerance. The bulk of Hook's writings just about the CP are devoted to showing that the CP is engaged in *external* opposition to the democratic *status quo*, and therefore is conspiratorial, and hence intolerable.

One may judge with the hindsight of fifty years that Hook overestimated the threat that the CP posed. But the pragmatic question concerns what *Hook* was justified in believing, not what we should *now* believe—again, with all the clarity of hindsight—about the severity of the threat. Hence our concern is not whether Hook was correct about the threat the CP posed; rather, it is whether Hook was correct to think that a commitment to democracy requires the kind of measures he advocated when faced with the kind of threat he believed was prevalent. As I have indicated, I find it difficult to disagree with Hook on this score. I conclude, then, that Hook's position concerning CP teachers is fully consistent with his pragmatic commitments.

But, as the view that Hook was not really a pragmatist collapses, so too does the entire eclipse narrative. Once Hook is brought into the picture, we

see that not only did pragmatist arguments and theses continue to shape the character of mainstream philosophy, but also that pragmatism was very well represented in the public arena. Again, once we have a clear view of the matter, we find that pragmatism is among the most successful philosophical movements ever. But where does this leave our discussion of pragmatism and the Cold War?

Rorty has claimed that in the years following World War II “all that happened was that the philosophy professors got bored with James and Dewey and latched on to something that looked new and promising” (2004: 284). Although Rorty is correct to reject the eclipse narrative, this rather blasé alternative cannot be the entire story. For one thing, Rorty’s account leaves one to wonder why James and Dewey began to look boring, and why other options seemed promising. I think Rorty’s account should be supplemented along the following lines.

To begin, it is worth reminding ourselves of two related facts. First, the alleged eclipse of pragmatism coincides not only with the Cold War, but also with Dewey’s gradual withdrawal from the intellectual scene and eventual death in 1952. Second, the pragmatism that was allegedly eclipsed was primarily Deweyan pragmatism.⁹ Accordingly, in order to fill in the story of pragmatism and the Cold War, we need to look at Dewey’s version of pragmatism.

Dewey explicitly conceived of his pragmatism in revolutionary terms. He thought that the truth of Darwinism required a comprehensive reconstruction of philosophy in which traditional problems of philosophy, and the categories which they presumed, would be discarded; Dewey declared that “we do not solve” the traditional problems of philosophy, we “get over them” (*MW* 4: 14). Consequently, Dewey’s philosophy begins from a sweeping attack on all the standard philosophical schools and positions: rationalism, idealism, absolutism, essentialism, sense data empiricism, epistemic foundationalism, metaphysical realism, correspondence theories of truth, mind–body dualism, logical atomism, utilitarianism and deontology in ethics, social contractarianism, and so on. Perhaps the novelty of Dewey’s critique took proponents

⁹ Peirce was always highly regarded among professional philosophers; however, the full import of his thought could not be estimated, due to the unavailability of a systematic edition of his writings. For this reason, Peirce’s pragmatism was never the dominant version. As for James, his pragmatism was never regarded as canonical, and his own articulations of pragmatist themes were largely rejected by subsequent pragmatists, including Dewey. On Dewey’s reaction to James’s pragmatism, see especially his 1908 essay “What Pragmatism Means by ‘Practical’” (*MW* 4: 98–115).

of these positions by surprise; for Dewey did not simply introduce new considerations into the standing debates, he criticized the presuppositions underlying the debates themselves. Typically, Dewey argued that all parties to any given long-standing debate in philosophy had presupposed some dualism—man and nature, permanence and change, reason and emotion, ideal and real, mind and body, individual and community, subject and object (*LW* 4: 195)—that had been rendered obsolete by Darwinism. Hence, according to Dewey, philosophy’s past is composed of a series of mere “puzzles” (*LW* 1: 17) to be discarded as “chaff” (*LW* 1: 4).

Unlike Rorty, who saw pragmatism as a rejection of philosophy altogether, Dewey’s project was not merely critical. Dewey spent his career building a comprehensive philosophical framework based in a distinctive brand of pragmatism that he called *empirical naturalism* or *experimentalism*. By the early 1940s, Dewey had constructed a grand and integrated—almost Hegelian—system of metaphysics, logic, psychology, epistemology, ethics, aesthetics, politics, and theology. Indeed, many of Dewey’s contemporary followers see the “organic unity” (Fesmire 2003: 70) of Dewey’s philosophy as a principal virtue.

What we see in the mid-1900s, however, is a series of new articulations of the old positions that Dewey claimed to have dissolved. Frequently, these new articulations were designed to respond to precisely the kind of objections that Dewey had proposed. Consider just a few examples. In the 1950s and 1960s, John Rawls proposed a new methodology for moral theory and a new defense of contractarianism which rejected intuitionism, egoism, utilitarianism, and the metaphysical extravagances of Kantianism. In the late 1950s and following, Roderick Chisholm devised foundationalist epistemology that was also fallibilist. In the 1960s, philosophers of language such as Jerrold Katz and Jerry Fodor drew on Chomsky’s work in linguistics to devise a new kind of rationalism and nativism rooted in empirical data; around the same time, John Searle resuscitated mind–body dualism in a form consistent with naturalism. By the 1970s, powerful new versions of nearly all of the traditional philosophical positions, and, importantly, compelling new studies of key historical figures—including Dewey’s principal foes, Descartes and Kant—had emerged.

The availability of ostensibly viable new instantiations of traditional positions challenged Dewey’s strategy of dismissing entire philosophical schools as premised on a single simple error. New Kantians relied upon the method of reflective equilibrium, not transcendental metaphysics; new foundationalists

did not need to embark on a “quest for certainty”; new rationalists could appeal to scientific data in support of their semantics; philosophers of mind could adopt a *property* dualism of mind and body, thereby eschewing the Cartesian metaphysics of dual substances. Whether any of these new positions is philosophically successful is of course debatable. To repeat, my point is that the development of these views rendered unsustainable Dewey’s claim that Darwinism supplied a perspective from which centuries of philosophy could be swept away with a single intellectual gesture; it no longer seemed plausible to assert, with Dewey, that his philosophical approach was “the way, and the only way . . . by which one can freely accept the standpoint and conclusions of modern science” (*LW* 1: 4). Accordingly, those who favored the kind of pragmatism and naturalism associated with Dewey were driven to abandon Dewey’s style of criticism. They had to engage the new developments piecemeal, argument by argument.

This in turn led to a general distrust of the kind of comprehensive philosophical system building in which Dewey engaged. It no longer seemed useful to erect what John Stuhr calls, in characterizing Dewey’s philosophy, “a comprehensive account of experience, inquiry, logic, education, morality, religion, and art” (1998: 85). Most of those active in professional philosophy had come to see that no set of philosophical premises full-bodied enough to support a system was non-controversial enough to justify the effort of grand system building. The most philosophers could pursue was a defensible account of some more or less specific phenomenon, with the hope that such an account could be shown to hang together with similar accounts of related phenomena. But note that this humbling of philosophical ambition is driven by the utterly *pragmatic* insight that, when no single approach can plausibly claim to be the only responsible way of proceeding, philosophy itself must advance dialectically and in piecemeal fashion, by way of meeting the arguments, challenges, and counterexamples raised by those who do not share one’s fundamental philosophical orientation.

Hence it seems more accurate to say that in the 1950s and 1960s Deweyan pragmatism, his “comprehensive account”, was in *crisis*, not eclipse. What was clear at that time was that if the tradition of pragmatic naturalism was to survive, it needed to be reworked, revised in light of new challenges. Here, the post-Deweyan pragmatists *par excellence* are Hook and Quine. Hook offers no grand system, but rather highly focused attempts to articulate and defend a generally naturalist and experimentalist approach to very specific problems in philosophy and politics. Similarly, Quine’s corpus presents an ongoing

development of a few key pragmatist and naturalist insights about science, language, and ontology, and an attempt to fit them together. Importantly, both Hook and Quine proceed by way of critical engagement with non-naturalist critics and interlocutors. It is unsurprising that after Dewey's death Quine quickly rose to become so influential among professional philosophers in America; for he understood, with Hook, that the case for pragmatic naturalism was to be made on a case-by-case basis, not by way of a "comprehensive account" of everything under the sun. For similar reasons, it is no surprise that the Dewey that emerges heroic in Rorty's work is a "therapeutic" Dewey (Rorty 1977: 73), a Dewey shorn of system.

Hence, what is seen by those committed to the eclipse narrative as a turn towards insularity, irrelevance, and technicality-for-its-own-sake is actually a pragmatically responsible reaction to the sheer plurality of philosophically forceful competitors, a plurality that Dewey had explicitly denied. The Cold War era saw no eclipse or abandonment of pragmatism; rather, the Cold War coincided with the period in which pragmatism was forced to confront powerful challenges from opponents who had the opportunity to revise and rework their positions in light of pragmatist criticisms. Once again, we see that, far from being marginalized or excluded, pragmatism remained highly influential throughout the second half of the twentieth century.

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